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There has been much recent discussion devoted to police misconduct in the United States,
with particular focus on police brutality, which has certainly been merited. Often enough, there is
a shift to discussion of what the police ought to be, or what individuals or groups had once
thought to be the function of law enforcement, but there are some important considerations many
neglect to make about the genesis and evolution of police theory, as well as its practical
applications and institutional raisons d’être. One may be able to better comprehend the functions
and motives of police by examining their societal impact through a Foucauldian lens. Michel
Foucault provides an insightful and easily applicable framework for understanding relations of
power and their pervasiveness, as well as the techniques and applications of discipline as it
benefits the state or other ruling power. His understanding of the nature of government and its
subservient institutions are easily transposed on that of law enforcement, and it serves to make
the “hows” and “whys” of some forms of police misconduct and overreach more clear. From this
perspective, it becomes easier to understand not only the actions or motives of state and local law
enforcement, but also the decisions they and other powerful institutions make regarding
individual rights.
Of course, some historical background must be known before one can begin to make
judgments about the overall trajectory of policing, and so this work begins with a brief foray into
police theory history and the significant alterations from iteration to iteration. With that
groundwork established, the focus will turn to an explanation of the theoretical aspects of
Foucault’s work, with particular emphasis placed on the aspects of his theory of power.
Following this is an application of Foucauldian theory to present day police tactics, as well as to
the inter-agency and -institution collaboration and reciprocity one often notices involving the
police. This section will deal in detail with not only the strategies used by the police to accrue
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power, but also the forms and applications of their power over communities and in relation to
other institutions. Using Foucault’s perspective on power and opinions on effective methods of
enacting social change, this work will conclude with some suggestions for putting this
knowledge to use.
I. Development of Police Theories
As one might expect to happen over the centuries, our understanding of what policing is
today hardly resembles its original conceptualization. This apparatus of state control and
self-regulation—the latter of which will be discussed in more detail later—first started to become
an entity separate from the military in the sixteenth century, though both the theory and practice
of the police has not ceased to grow and morph. From its initial conception to its current
iteration, the concept of policing has inarguably shifted away from some of its original aims and
intended services. The ways in which policing changed to fit the needs of the state provide
important context as to how some police forces developed to look quite different from others, as
well as to highlight their few but incredibly significant similarities in function. Policing has
always been a form of social regulation, though its form and function has changed with the
methods of control made available to it as techniques of government and technological advances
have occurred.
i. 16th-17th Century European Police Theory
The word “police” in the sixteenth century was not, in fact, assigned to a state-authorized
force. Instead, the word had one of three meanings: “[a] form of community or association
governed by a public authority, a sort of human society when something like political power or
public authority is exercised over it,” “precisely the set of actions that direct these communities
under public authority,” or “the positive and valued result of good government.”1 At this time,
1
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Arterberry 4

“police” could refer to the entity concerning itself with the management of a community, or to a
conceptual schema for community management. The referent of the first definition could be as
simple as “society,” though not reduced to any lesser level than that, for “[a] family, or a convent
won't be said to be a police, precisely because they lack the characteristic exercise of a public
authority over them,”2 while the latter two definitions relate to good conduct or outcome in
communal management. Under the feudal model, communities were beholden to the king, but
lacked a system of law enforcement anything like those we see today. As it is in modernity, each
European state’s power was typically vested in two main branches: the inter-state force—the
diplomatic core and the army—and the intra-state force—police, or the bodies of internal societal
regulation that were considered such at that time.3 Long before the 17th and 18th century boom
in urbanization, forms of regulation within each major hub of trade and commerce already
existed, and these, plus the occasional duties of the king’s men—for one, the maréchaussée, in
the case of the French—were more or less lifted from these previous roles by reformers and
combined into a new idea of “police.”4 Foucault notes the development of police was, at least in
some part, informed by this urbanization, as there was a belief amongst intellectuals at this time,
e.g. Domat, that “the link between police and town is so strong that […] it is only because there
is police […] regulating this cohabitation, circulation, and exchange that towns were able to
exist.”5
The concept of “police” begins to morph into something else by the seventeenth
century—it “begins to refer to the set of means by which the state's forces can be increased while
preserving the state in good order. In other words, police will be the calculation and technique
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that will make it possible to establish a mobile, yet stable and controllable relationship between
the state's internal order and the development of its forces.”6 The two main goals of such a force
were set forth as being “splendor,” which concerns both the aesthetic appeal and strength of the
state, and “foster[ing] working and trading relations between men, as well as aid and mutual
help.”7 It is important to note here is that there are aspects of this idea of “police” that are
designed to promote civil wellbeing outside of repression of crime. Exemplifying this is a work
written by French scholar Turquet de Mayerne, La Monarchie aristodemocratique; in it, he
outlines a “utopia of a police state,” wherein police “is directed towards men's activity, but
insofar as this activity has a relationship to the state,” and “[w]hat is characteristic of [this model
of a] police state is its interest in what men do; it is interested in their activity, their ‘occupation’.
The objective of police is therefore control of and responsibility for men's activity insofar as this
activity constitutes a differential element in the development of the state's forces.”8 This system
placed the police in charge of knowledge and care of the population, specifically charging them
with providing necessities, work, and reinforcing public wellness and safety, as well as creating
and maintaining routes of trade.9 Their ultimate goal is to “[link] together the state's strength and
individual felicity. This felicity, as the individual's better than just living, must in some way be
drawn on and constituted into state utility: making men's happiness the state's utility, making
men's happiness the very strength of the state”—and the police are to accomplish this aim
through “disciplining” the populace, exerting their regulatory power over them.10 There also
emerges a new focus on and importance assigned to statistics, as a means both of keeping track
of the state’s resources but also foreign states’ resources, which “can be established precisely by
6
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9
Foucault, 323-326.
10
Foucault, 327-328.
7

Arterberry 6

police, for police itself, as the art of developing forces, presupposes that each state exactly
identifies its possibilities, its virtualities. Police makes statistics necessary, but police also makes
statistics possible. For it is precisely the whole set of procedures set up to increase, combine, and
develop forces, it is this whole administrative assemblage that makes it possible to identify what
each state's forces comprise and their possibilities of development. […] Statistics is the state's
knowledge of the state, understood as the state's knowledge both of itself and also of other
states.”11 This marks a shift in the state’s methods for keeping power over its people, as it became
aware of the viability and benefits of this relatively “new” technology.
Foucault acknowledges that every European state, because of differences in language,
culture, and history, approached the idea of police differently. Although the differences between
the various theories of police are noticeable, one French scholar, Delamare, created a police
theory that more or less synthesized the French and German models.12 Delamare charges the
police with thirteen unique responsibilities: “religion, morals, health and subsistence, public
peace, the care of buildings, squares, and highways, the sciences and the liberal arts, commerce,
manufacture and the mechanical arts, servants and laborers, the theater and games, and finally
the care and discipline of the poor.”13 What Foucault intends to make clear about this model is
what these duties can be condensed into—that they are urban objects. An urban object is “urban
in the sense that some only exist in the town and because there is a town. […] Others are objects
that are problems falling under police inasmuch as they are especially significant in towns,” or,
more plainly, they are “problems of coexistence, and of dense coexistence.”14 This form of police
cannot exist without an urban center or centers, and their domains are social and financial.

11
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It is key to note that their function was never, at any point, intended to be judicial:
“[p]olice is not justice. Whether written by those who support and justify the need for a police, or
by jurists or parliamentarians who display a certain mistrust of police, all the texts agree on this:
police is seen as not being justice. Of course, like justice it derives from royal power, but it
remains clearly separated from justice.”15 The apparatus of the police “does not operate through
the judicial apparatus, but is a permanent coup d’État coming directly from the royal power, but
what is the instrument of this permanent coup d’État? […] Police intervenes in a regulatory
manner. […] We are in a world of indefinite regulation, of permanent, continually renewed, and
increasingly detailed regulation, but always regulation, always in the kind of form that, if not
judicial, is nevertheless juridical: the form of the law, or at least of law as it functions in a
mobile, permanent, and detailed way in the regulation.”16
ii. 18th Century Reforms of Police Theory and Police Forces
Predictably, this idea of an utopic police state crumbles in the face of reality, and theory
of policing evolves to take a new form. There is something suspect about a theory of governance
that espoused the following: “[t]he police includes everything. But from an extremely particular
point of view. [...] Men's coexistence on a territory; their relationships as to property; what they
produce; what is exchanged on the market. It also considers how they live, the diseases and
accidents that can befall them”—Foucault rightly notes this vastness of their role reeks of
authoritarianism.17 It is unsurprising that, eventually, there were alternatives proposed to this
theory. Furthermore, as European nations became more and more mercantilist, accruing the most
wealth became one of the state’s primary objectives. In order to accomplish this, they had to
manage growing their populations and producing goods to trade, all while ensuring as little
15
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payment as feasible ever reached the hands of the very producers of goods that the state trades.18
With such a model of “equilibrium,” police makes itself a necessary instrument for any country
that wanted to be commercially viable within such a system.19 It is little surprise that, with an
economic overhaul such as this, it was the économistes who proposed a new system of discipline
in this era; French jurists, though critical, didn't clamor for a new system to replace the current
police. The issue the économistes took with the idealized model of the seventeenth century was
due to a new form of governmentality, one that gave new form and focus to state rationality
(raison d’État)—that is, how the state organizes itself and carries out its various functions.20
For what kinds of change did the économistes advocate? Theirs, rather self-evidently, was
of a more economic focus than the theory of what Foucault refers to as the politiques, creating a
“new naturalness” in the state’s economy that is “specific to relations between men, to what
happens spontaneously when they cohabit, come together, exchange, work, and produce […] the
naturalness of society.”21 They utilize “scientific knowledge” or rationality to fortify the raison
d’État, hence the shift from solely militaristic or diplomatic views; there is now a need for
analysis and empirical evidence in government, establishing a firm link between the art of
government and science.22 There is also a new emphasis on the management of population, not
merely on the increase or decrease of one’s population, but rather as it is relevant to the
exchange, creation, and distribution of funds—that is, discipline, as will later be discussed—, as
well as new limitations the government placed upon its ministrations to society. 23The idea that
the state was to be shepherd and sheepdog within the same organizations was identified as naïve
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and unworkable, replaced by a new objective of creating mechanisms of security, “the security of
the natural phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to population.”24
As the effects of specialization and “scientific knowledge” seep into other areas of theory
of governance, the previous intended role of the police is halved: “[g]rowth within order and all
positive functions will be answered by a whole series of institutions, apparatuses, mechanisms,
and so on, and then the elimination of disorder will be the function of the police.”25 Where the
previous model of policing had some positive function in engaging in various acts of care or
concern for improving the wellbeing of society through education or charity, it now retains only
its negative charge—to suppress the many forms of disorder that cause disruptions within the
community. In practice, French police also became much more concerned with “crimes of fraud”
within the eighteenth century, as financial crime replaced violent crime as the most common
form of criminality.26 Partly due to this shift in criminal activity, as well as the general populace’s
migration from rural areas to preexistent and new urban centers, police takes on an even greater
role in surveilling society, as, in order to keep its power over a populace, it must “be given the
instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as
long as it could itself remain invisible. It had to be like a faceless gaze that transformed the
whole social body into a field of perception: thousands of eyes posted everywhere, mobile
attentions ever on the alert, a long, hierarchized network.”27
The économiste theorists had so changed the conceptualization of community
management and police that the welfare aspects had completely evaporated, instead replaced by
a preoccupation with this notion of “safety”—of a mainly economic mien. What these
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seventeenth- and eighteenth-century intellectuals “understand by ‘police’ is not an institution or
mechanism functioning within the state but a governmental technology peculiar to the
state—domains, techniques, targets where the state intervenes.”28 At this time, there were, of
course, constables and officials whose roles we vaguely recognize as precursors of the ‘police’ of
today, but alongside them came the development of other sciences to regulate relationships
between and attitudes of the state’s populace. Though distinct from one another, these
institutions, these apparently independent expressions of state power never separated in their
primary function, nor departed from their relative codependence on one another.
iii. The Development and Evolution of American Policing
For a significant period of time in the post-Revolution United States, there was no
centralized or government-funded police force, just as there was no national militia. In line with
the development of police forces in European nations, the first locations in America to develop
their own form of community policing were major cities: “Boston created a night watch in 1636,
New York in 1658 and Philadelphia in 1700.” 29 These night watches were funded by private
citizens, and those serving the community were part time “volunteers”—though it is worth
noting these volunteers did not always fulfill their promised services, nor were they necessarily
qualified for their positions, as many were “attempting to evade military service, were conscripts
forced into service by their town, or were performing watch duties as a form of punishment.”30 In
addition to their disorganized and undisciplined workforce, these watch systems had duties that
extended beyond “keeping the peace”. Adopting some of the aspects of Turquet’s system of
police utopia, members of the watch were expected to “[provide] social services, including
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lighting street lamps, running soup kitchens, recovering lost children, capturing runaway
animals, and a variety of other services.” 31 This disorganized force was eventually overseen and
phased out by the implementation of constables in major cities, whose duties were not only
peace-keeping, criminal-retrieval, and crime-deterrence, but also “serving as land surveyors and
verifying the accuracy of weights and measures. In many cities constables were given the
responsibility of supervising the activities of the night watch.”32 Eventually, the distinct roles of
constable and night watchman merged as their external duties fell away or were appropriated by
other social apparatuses. With the ‘birth’ of the American municipal police force in Boston in
1860—and, more significantly, the other major cities that followed its example—, there emerged
the “framework” of our modern forces, the major characteristics of which police scholar Gary
Potter aptly identifies: “(1) they were publicly supported and bureaucratic in form; (2) police
officers were full-time employees, not community volunteers or case-by-case fee retainers; (3)
departments had permanent and fixed rules and procedures, and employment as a police officers
was continuous; (4) police departments were accountable to a central governmental authority.”33
These core aspects of the foundation of the municipal police are symptomatic of the large-scale
movement towards federalization of apparatuses of public defense and welfare.
Notably distinct from the European theorizations of police was the racial element in
American Police history, which was the driving impetus behind the creation of a different kind of
police force in the South: the slave patrol. The first of these was founded in the Carolinas in
1704. Its functions were “(1) to chase down, apprehend, and return to their owners, runaway
slaves; (2) to provide a form of organized terror to deter slave revolts; and, (3) to maintain a form
of discipline for slave-workers who were subject to summary justice, outside of the law, if they
31
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violated any plantation rules.”34 Though the treatment of minorities and immigrants to the United
States was hardly much fairer or friendlier in the great northern cities, the roots and functions of
the slave patrol undeniably bled into the later evolutions of police in the postbellum South with
an explicitly anti-black agenda, “primarily as a means of controlling freed slaves who were now
laborers working in an agricultural caste system, and enforcing ‘Jim Crow’ segregation laws,
designed to deny freed slaves equal rights and access to the political system.”35
What remains consistent in all this? There is, in all the systems outlined and followed
through the Enlightenment period, a push towards centralization of governance and regulation of
the social body by a whole host of public institutions. Alongside this, there is a categorization
and hierarchization of previously unmanaged, “wild” territory: a careful observation and
management of the relationships and exchanges between individuals, sometimes under the guise
of facilitation, other times, as is the case for ‘police’, under the guise of safeguarding. There are
great incentives for the state to surveil its populace, to guide it, without forcing it, into adopting
certain customs and practices that benefit the economy, as well as to guard against any
circumventing of the new ideas of governmentality. Police begins to grow into its new role, its
bureaucratic nature—at the very least in the American scheme of governance—serving
eventually to warp and shift the priorities of the institution in a variety of lucrative and abusive
ways. These will soon be dragged into the light for the purpose of public scrutiny and academic
discourse, but not before the relevant, essential elements of Foucault’s work on power are made
clear. It is essential to this undertaking that one is familiar with his understanding of relationships
between institutions and relationships of power; it is through his work that we come closer to

34
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understanding the currents between bodies of influence and how it is that they so effectively
impact and manage our lives.
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II. Foucault on Power (and Theory in General)
One can easily be forgiven for assuming from the previous section of this inquiry that it
preceded a historical or political critique of policing, but that is not this project’s sole intention.
While the background of the history of police theory and its key concepts and themes are
essential for understanding the development of police from the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries to the present, looking at police theory more broadly, one will be able to see a
framework that one may find the police have in common with other social institutions that, at
first, seem not to have similar ends—that is, until one simplifies them and thinks of their goals in
terms of the state: discipline, surveillance, control, prosperity. The police are not an isolated
entity; they are inextricable from the weblike structure that connects all of the state’s apparatuses
of power. Furthermore, though the history of the police and policing is of use to this work, it is
necessary to emphasize that neither the history of policing nor that of police theory can be taken
as determinative of the present. While clearly the present always results from the past,
determinism has no place in Foucault’s works, nor in this project. The relationship of the past, in
all of its complexity, to the present, in all of its complexity, can never be reduced to any sort of
linear or simple causality.
i. Foucault on Power, Relations of Power, and the Truth-Power Dynamic
Foucault has a very particular understanding of power. When discussing the forms and
development of “state rationality” and the precursors to modern “governmentality,” he elaborates
more overtly than is typical on his unique outlook on this hierarchy-enforcing function:
Power is not a substance. Neither is it a mysterious property whose origin must be delved
into. Power is only a certain type of relation between individuals. Such relations are
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specific, that is, they have nothing to do with exchange, production, communication, even
though they combine with them. The characteristic feature of power is that some men can
more or less entirely determine other men's conduct—but never exhaustively or
coercively. A man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over
him, not power. But if he can be induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have
been to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain
way. His freedom has been subjected to power. He has been submitted to government. If
an individual can remain free, however little his freedom may be, power can subject him
to government. There is no power without potential refusal or revolt.36
From this, there is the obvious takeaway that Foucault would disdain a Platonic effort to
discover the ultimate “form” of power—or any such ideal “form,” for that matter—as pointless
and devoid of content, but, far more significant than that is his idea that power necessarily relies
on relationships, on social exchange in order to exist. While it seems at first a more sociological
claim and perspective than philosophical—and certainly there is an aspect of Foucault’s work
that is overtly sociological or anthropological—this view of the power relation has its roots in
Hegelian thought. Relationships that exert power over a subject appear frequently to take a
prescriptive form: consider Foucault’s interest in medicine, psychiatry, social forms of regulation
of commerce and communication, and the work of Enlightenment intellectuals and reformers.
There is something about this kind of authority that is not “totalitarian” or domination over the
subject in the lesser role as there seems to be in the sense of the master-slave dynamic, but there
is nevertheless an inarguable power imbalance between doctor-patient, teacher-student, and
police-civilian. Beyond this, there is another, perhaps less stable web of relationships of power

36
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between institutions that serve the state—how the sciences interact with one another, adding to or
disputing the authority of another. Foucault himself recognizes three distinct forms of power
struggle: “against forms of domination (ethnic, social, and religious); against forms of
exploitation that separate individuals from what they produce; or against that which ties the
individual to himself and submits him to others in this way.”37
The situation he uses to illustrate how power is exerted over another is a curious one. It is
only by the confession extracted from him that the tortured man’s captors have power over him,
and not by mere virtue of their physical domination of him. In this case, it becomes a use of
power because the man had the option to remain silent, to, in a way, refuse to be a party to this
power play, even if it meant his death. Foucault claims that, “[i]f an individual can remain free,
however little his freedom may be, power can subject him to government. There is no power
without potential refusal or revolt.”38 This is perhaps one of the most controversial
and—initially—least intuitive aspects of Foucault’s definition; it even goes against the
Hobbesian belief that coercion is a necessary component of such covenants between men,
groups, or nations39. Foucault believes that the “choice” for one to do otherwise, autonomy, is
necessary for there to be power exerted over an individual—without that possibility, as
discouraged and inadvisable as rebellion or refusal may be in a situation, there is no need for
power to coerce or guide someone without it. One cannot exert “power” over a robot, only
control over its actions, because, at least at present, there is no consciousness or program running
within it that would propose a different course of action: all it “knows” are the instructions given
to it. It is by virtue of his consciousness, his ability to refuse and to be uncooperative that the
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man, when conceding to his captors, was subjected to power.40 To apply this to the
conceptualization of power as it is present in members of respected institutions’ relationships
with the greater public is quite simple; the learning, training, or occupation of certain individuals
places them in a position of authority over members of a society—and the society’s acceptance
of this assertion of authority creates their power over public opinion, the permissible acts of
civilians, and so on.
One would not be remiss in asking, however, what basis and qualities exactly the nature
of the relationship between individuals that exerts some form of authority or control has. It may
be easier to begin by outlining what the relationship is not, or at least, is not entirely. Foucault
cautions against viewing power as repression, as he considers it “quite inadequate for capturing
what is precisely the productive aspect of power. In defining the effects of power as repression,
one identifies power with a law that says no—power is taken, above all, as carrying the force of a
prohibition. Now, I believe that this is a wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power,
one that has been curiously widespread. If power were never anything but repressive, if it never
did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes
power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the act that it doesn't only weigh on us as a
force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge,
produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the
whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.”41 To
understand the mechanisms of power, it is perhaps more beneficial to consider it in terms of
oppressive relations between people.

40
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Foucault also disagrees with assigning the concept of power an inherently militaristic
aspect: “[a]s soon as one endeavors to detach power with its techniques and procedures from the
form of law within which it has been theoretically confined up until now, one is driven to ask this
basic question: Isn't power simply a form of warlike domination? […] A whole range of
problems emerge here. Who wages war against whom? Is it between two classes, or more? Is it a
war of all against all? What is the role of the army and military institutions in this civil society
where permanent war is waged? What is the relevance of concepts of tactics and strategy for
analyzing structures and political processes? All these questions need to be explored. In any case,
it's astonishing to see how easily and self-evidently people talk of warlike relations of power or
of class struggle without ever making it clear whether some form of war is meant, and if so what
form”42. Foucault finds this oversimplification of power as a militaristic phenomenon unhelpful,
as his understanding of relations of power has more nuance and plenty of variation in its subtly
oppressive manifestations. Similarly, he insists that it is not a matter of some consensual
agreement—at least, not necessarily: “[i]n itself, it is not the renunciation of freedom, a transfer
of rights, or power of each and all delegated to a few […]; the relationship of power may be an
effect of a prior or permanent consent, but it is not by nature the manifestation of a consensus.”43
Foucault acknowledges that often threats of violence or the obtaining of consent has some
bearing on power relations, but it is most beneficial and accurate to think of them as “a set of
actions on possible actions; [a power relation] incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or
more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains
or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue
of their acting or being capable of action.”44
42
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Power relations can be studied quite effectively as they exist in the form of the “expert’s
opinion” or the strong recommendations of apparatuses of the state, directives the populace has
the ability to defy, but, either from fear, respect, or some other conditioning, they choose to obey.
This is not to say that power is institutional; Foucault makes clear that he believes “one must
analyze institutions from the standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa, and that the
fundamental point of anchorage of the relationships, even if they are embodied and crystallized
in an institution, is to be found outside the institution.”45 Contrary to Hobbes, Foucault believes
that science, or, in his terms, knowledge, is one of the most effective and prevalent vectors
through which power is exerted over others.46 The many institutions of government or those
unaffiliated that nevertheless serve the aims of the class or person(s) in power, such as schools,
prisons, the military, the natural sciences (medicine, psychiatry, etc.) wield a subtler authority
over the public, but it is nevertheless an effective and “official” authority in their assigned realms
of influence. These institutions are a productive power, rather than merely oppressive or
restrictive: they produce knowledge, and at the same time, that knowledge is used to condition a
populace’s attitudes and behavior. These relations of power are much more flexible than a rigid
caste system, or conquerors physically subjugating the conquered. They seek to instill in the
communities they manage a perpetual evolution of and continued need for the services they
provide, all while reinforcing the authority of the governing body to which they belong or are
beholden.
Despite its close connection to fields of science, it would be a mistake to qualify power as
necessarily aligning with “truth”—or it being contingent on there being a truth at all. Foucault
defines truth as “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution,
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circulation, and operation of statements,” and claims it is “linked in a circular relation with
systems of power that produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which
extend it—a ‘regime’ of truth.” 47 This is not an especially flattering portrayal of the role of truth
in society; Foucault’s conception of it falls in line with Nietzsche’s, in which it is a subjective
concept and is necessarily related to some external politics. Foucault further distances himself
from the traditionalist, moralist view of “objective truth”:
[T]ruth isn't outside power or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and
functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of
protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating
themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms
of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth,
its ‘general politics’ of truth—that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function
as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false
statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying
what counts as true.48
The major takeaways here are that “social” truth is not objective, it is not
“transcendent”—or the fruit of enlightened thought, and it is inherently political in nature. This
does not detract from the “value” of truth, but it does alter it; it has been dragged down from its
illusory pedestal into the muck of power relations alongside knowledge and “reason,” now able
to be better understood in its function since its glamor has been stripped away. If truth is what
proofs or “laws” are established by a particular society in order to function, then it stands to
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reason that, if they are unsatisfactory to the governed, they might be disputed and overthrown.
Foucault believes that “[t]he essential political problem for the intellectual is not to criticize the
ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensure that his own scientific practice is
accompanied by a correct ideology, but that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new
politics of truth. The problem is not changing people's consciousnesses—or what’s in their
heads—but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth.”49 In order to
bring about effective change in a society, one has to work to change the basis upon which it
functions, rather than trying to convince people to go against their community or state’s norms
and beliefs.
ii. Governmentality: Foucault on State Rationality
It may also be useful to briefly touch on the subject of state rationality, or raison d’État.
A product of the enlightenment era, the “art of government” has a somewhat different aim than
that of the previous widely-employed model of governance of the feudal sovereign. This new
idea’s “task is absolutely specific: it consists in governing, and its model is found neither in God
nor in nature. At the end of the sixteenth century, the emergence of the specificity of the level
and form of government is expressed by the new problematization of what was called the res
publica, the public domain or state (la chose publique).”50 One should make particular note of
the mention of specificity, as this is one of the most significant differences between this new “art
of government” and the sovereign or Prince—à la Machiavelli—, as it concerns itself more with
particulars, with the molecular level of society, than the previous heads of states. It is distinct
from and greater in scale than the domain of the sovereign, it is not inherently pastoral, it is
separate from—and sometimes even opposes—the dictum of the “natural order of things”.
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Foucault describes its earliest form thus: “this something without a model, which must find its
model, is the art of government.”51 According to Botero, raison d’État is “the knowledge of the
appropriate means for founding, preserving, and expanding [a domination over peoples],” which
is certainly an accurate enough description for what it becomes.52
As a matter of self-preservation, a state must continue to expand its influence and amass
power in order to survive encounters with enemy states or other threatening forces, and so it
must find ways to strengthen itself.53 One such way is, obviously, through doing well in trade,
dominating the economic sphere of human relations. This revelation explains the sudden interest
in the molecular, individual level of society; because “reason of state is not an art of government
according to divine, natural, or human laws[, it] doesn't have to respect the general order of the
world. It’s government in accordance with the state’s strength. It’s government whose aim is to
increase this strength within an extensive and competitive framework,” it has incentive and
plenty to gain from effective management of its resources, both in terms of trade and labor.54
This “art of government” necessitates the creation of artificial concepts and guidelines in order to
function efficiently; it is no coincidence that theory of economics, police, and property law
become of such great import at the same time that the state’s methods and focus are shifting and
expanding according to this new rationality. Raison d’État is “intimately bound up with the
development of what was then called either political ‘statistics’ or ‘arithmetic,’ that is, the
knowledge of different states’ respective forces,” which gives this style of governance a distinct
advantage over other forms in terms of the economic and social power it commands through this
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specific knowledge—and the specialized control this knowledge makes possible—that it has of
its citizens’ activities. 55
The “modern” state, though it does recognize class and specific groups, majorities and
minorities, no longer remains on the molar level of governance. Foucault notes this as the unique
strength of its design, as it is “both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power. […] This is
due to the fact that the modern Western state has integrated into a new political shape an old
power technique that originated in Christian institutions. We can call this power technique
‘pastoral power.’”56 It is distinct from pastoral power in its traditional form, though, mainly in
that it is not necessarily religious. The objective of this new “secular” pastoral power was “no
longer [to lead] people to their salvation in the next world but rather, ensuring it in this world.
And in this context, the word ‘salvation’ takes on different meanings: health, well-being (that is,
sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents. A series of ‘worldly’
aims took the place of the religious aims of the traditional pastorate.”57 Such a complex network
of fields could not be overseen by the old form of government; many new institutions rose up to
fill the needs of the state and enact its aims, diverse in their alignment: “[s]ometimes this form of
power was exerted by state apparatus or, in any case, by a public institution such as the police.
[…] Sometimes the power was exercised by private ventures, welfare societies, benefactors, and
generally by philanthropists. But ancient institutions, for example the family, were also
mobilized at this time to take on pastoral functions.”58 Each different apparatus of state power
had specific spheres of influence assigned as their domain in accordance with their size and
intended function. To summarize their general functions and goals, every one of these
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apparatuses that were formed or drawn in to serve the state, had one of two focuses: “one,
globalizing and quantitative, concerning the population; the other, analytical, concerning the
individual.”59
iii. Foucault on History as Pertains to Determinism
There is one important aspect of Foucault’s conceptualization of power that rests on a
much larger tenet of his philosophical and genealogical works: he does not indulge the idea that
there is some “necessity” of past events in bringing about the present. In an interview where
Foucault is asked to elaborate upon his idea of discontinuity in history, and his criticisms of
structuralist views—that hold that history necessarily “builds up from” the past—, he takes care
to clarify that “[his] problem was not at all to say ‘Voila, long live discontinuity, we are in the
discontinuous and a good thing too,’ but to pose the question ‘How is it that at certain moments
and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden take-offs, these hastenings of
evolution, these transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is
normally accredited?’”60 His denial of a deterministic view of history, that things must play out
in such and such way because of such and such past actions does not mean he believes that
history or genealogical work is worthless; what Foucault seems to find interesting—and worthy
of closer study—in history is “not that such changes can be rapid and extensive or, rather, it is
that this extent and rapidity are only the sign of something else—a modification in the rules of
formation of statements which are accepted as scientifically true. Thus, it is not a change of
content […], nor is it a change of theoretical form […]. It is a question of what governs
statements, and the way in which they govern each other so as to constitute a set of propositions
that are scientifically acceptable and, hence, capable of being verified or falsified by scientific
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procedures.”61 Though speaking specifically about “truths” and beliefs here, what Foucault says
about what makes them interesting can be applied more broadly. Noticing not just the content of
the history of a field, but its quickenings or stagnations, its sharp departures from tradition or its
dogged steadfastness to the old ideas can be just as interesting to consider in terms of their
influence—and what that influence has done or of what it is emblematic—than concrete events.
From The History of Madness, to The Archaeology of Knowledge, to Discipline &
Punish, Foucault’s underlying common interest throughout these works appears to be primarily
vested in uncovering and dissecting “internal regimes of power” in different “objective” fields
and the subtlety of their manifestations, and history provides some degree of causality, though it
is important to note that he makes use of the genealogy of institutions in his works quite
differently than a Hegelian might.62 He is adamant that “[h]istory has no ‘meaning,’ though this
is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be
susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail—but this is in accordance with the
intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics. Neither the dialectic, as the logic of
contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communication, can account for the intrinsic
intelligibility of conflicts.”63 That something happened in the past is not irrefutable proof that the
present could not be as it is without that event necessarily occurring, but that is not to say that
Foucault doesn’t believe there is a causal relationship between history and the current time. As
he puts it, “maybe intelligibility in history does not lie in assigning a cause that is always more or
less a metaphor for the source. Intelligibility in history would perhaps lie in something that we
could call the constitution or composition of effects.”64 When discussing the significance
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assigned to and use of events in his work, Foucault urges those reading it—and engaging in his
kind of historical work—to avoid “trying to do for the event what was previously done with the
concept of structure. It's not a matter of locating everything on one level, that of the event, but of
realizing that there are actually a whole order of levels of different types of events differing in
amplitude, chronological breadth, and capacity to produce effects.”65 Events remain critical for
understanding the present, but Foucault stresses their greatest utility arises not from considering
instances in isolation, but from distinguishing them from one another, exploring their relations,
connections to one another, and what, alone and together, they suggest about the field or network
to which they belong.66
The main things to keep in mind when applying these concepts as Foucault conceives of
them are that, for one, it is misguided to think of things like “power” and “truth” as having forms
in the Platonic sense; it is much more accurate and useful to view these as the social phenomena
that they are, which are inextricable from relations between people that exist on a variety of
different socio-political axes. Second, that the interest of the “modern” government is to manage
and oversee these axes, from the major to the most minute spheres of influence and exchange,
and that the focus has been on developing technologies and techniques to aid it in its
self-management. Third, though the evolution of state rationality and the evolution of police are
not only related but share a great interest in surveillance and discipline of citizens is not the
inevitable outcome of certain events or institutions belonging to the past; it is the nature of power
to want to expand its influence in whatever ways it is able, but the manifestation of power in
relations between states, groups, or individuals is not predetermined by their history.
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III . The Overreach of State Power in Policing; or, Nothing to Hide, Plenty to Fear
The police have undoubtedly become a very effective means of intra-state control, and
the tactics they employ to retain such a tight leash on the average citizen are many—not to
mention often invasive or incendiary. Despite plenty of footage showing the intimidating and
destructive force of SWAT teams and the wealth of horrifying bodycam footage of the conduct of
law enforcement officials that now exists, the accumulation of power by the police has largely
occurred through peaceful means. Foucault describes “[p]olice [as] the direct governmentality of
the sovereign qua sovereign. Or, again, let's say that police is the permanent coup d’État. It is the
permanent coup d’État that is exercised and functions in the name of and in terms of the
principles of its own rationality, without having to mold or model itself on the otherwise given
rules of justice.”67 It is an apparatus of power that, in its present iteration, serves the state through
monitoring the activities of its citizens and, when necessary, responding in some “appropriate”
way to the “wayward” members of society. These duties are key elements of Foucault’s study of
the function and “corrective” measures of prisons, though the duty of police is markedly different
than that of wardens or reformers at a correctional facility. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault
says this of discipline:
‘Discipline’ may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a
type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments,
techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of
power, a technology. And it may be taken over either by ‘specialized’ institutions (the
penitentiaries or ‘houses of correction’ of the nineteenth century), or by institutions that
use it as an essential instrument for a particular end (schools, hospitals), or by
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pre-existing authorities that find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganizing their internal
mechanisms of power […]; or by apparatuses that have made discipline their principle of
internal functioning (the disciplinarization of the administrative apparatus from the
Napoleonic period), or finally by state apparatuses whose major, if not exclusive,
function is to assure that discipline reigns over society as a whole (the police)68.
Notice that Foucault stresses the breadth of impact of discipline and what effects, ideally,
it should have on those being disciplined—and also remember what importance he shows this
phenomenon to have to police. The police have been entrusted with enforcing discipline within
society as a whole rather than being gifted some subtle set of tools with which to condition some
sect of the populace; their methods of enforcing discipline, however, make them better described
as a security force. Foucault is adamant that there are significant differences between apparatuses
of discipline and apparatuses of security, with discipline referring to knowledge production in
this context as opposed to training or conditioning a populace. One of the major differences he
stresses is that “[discipline] divide[s] everything according to a code of the permitted and the
forbidden. Then, within these two fields of the permitted and the forbidden, they specify and
precisely define what is forbidden and what is permitted, or rather, what is obligatory”69. The
function of disciplinary institutions is “not so much [on] the things one must not do as the things
that must be done. A good discipline tells you what you must do at every moment.”70 Security,
by contrast, is concerned with a different end entirely, as “what is involved is precisely not taking
either the point of view of what is prevented or the point of view of what is obligatory, but
standing back sufficiently so that one can grasp the point at which things are taking place,
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whether or not they are desirable.”71 The police are neither prescriptive nor corrective, but
reactive. The actions they take upon the intended targets, the acted upon, are not deliberated
upon beforehand in terms of reinforcing values, but of responding to what is in reality. The
function of police, then, is security, which “tries to work within reality, by getting the
components of reality to work in relation to each other, thanks to and through a series of analyses
and specific arrangements.”72 Looking at the expectations for United States state and local law
enforcement, police forces “are charged with upholding domestic laws that protect the rights of
citizens. Although they ‘combat’ crime within their jurisdictions, their goal is to not physically
annihilate criminals, but to maintain public order and ‘keep the peace.’ They are to protect the
rights of the citizenry, both victims and criminals alike. In the realm of domestic policing, the
police are, in principle, trained to resort to violence only as a matter of last resort.”73 This
corroborates the idea that they are not explicitly a force for discipline—that would fall to the
much more regulatory models for police coming out of the sixteenth century, the idealized
figures of community control that had a properly disciplinary function.
Foucault’s ambiguous definition of security’s way of responding to situations in reality
may read as slightly ominous to the modern reader, and this is with good cause. The police’s
function as security is for the state, not for the acted upon, and, accordingly, it is not always
pleasant—seemingly rarely the case, in fact—for those acted upon. Time and time again, much
like similar apparatuses of power, it has tested the bounds of what behavior can be excused as
acceptable in the eyes of the courts and has largely been rewarded for its audacity. Over time, a
significant amount of power and authority has been willingly relinquished to law enforcement
officers by the public and by the judiciary—though this accumulation of power has been greatly
71
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aided by complex relationships of mutually beneficial natures between the police and other
institutions, state-funded and otherwise. Another aspect of the nature of security in opposition to
discipline bears keeping in mind when engaging with what follows: apparatuses of security are
centrifugal74. This means that they are always trying to expand the scope of their involvement
and control, whereas apparatuses of discipline encompass their whole ‘sphere’ of influence and
must constrain their focus to act.75
i. The Surveillance State
Before diving into the tangled, messy network of private and public institutions that
enable one another to engage in grievous encroachments upon the rights of private citizens, there
is one such right that has been steadily eroded from the time of Enlightenment scholars
onwards—the right to privacy. In terms of the police, however, this violation of the privacy of
individuals is not a “bug,” but a “feature,” and, to a degree, a very necessary one that allows the
police to function: “[police] is an apparatus that must be coextensive with the entire social body
and not only by the extreme limits that it embraces, but by the minuteness of the details it is
concerned with. Police power must bear ‘over everything’: it is not however the totality of the
state nor of the kingdom as visible and invisible body of the monarch; it is the dust of events,
actions, behaviour, opinions—‘everything that happens.’”76 From the plainclothes agents of the
police on the streets and their many informants in the eighteenth century to today’s drones,
CCTV cameras posted in public areas, and even one’s own phone line, policing depends on
monitoring flows of activity within society in whatever form they may take, digital or physical.
Inarguably, methods of surveillance have become more invasive and inescapable than
ever before. Technology has come a long way in the past half-century, and the police, among
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other groups, have benefited greatly from these breakthroughs. Unlike with civilians, there have
been few meaningful constraints on what once only select branches of the military or
government agencies would have had at their disposal; “technologies once used exclusively by
the military, such as facial-recognition systems, thermal imaging, satellite monitoring, and retinal
scanners, are now regularly transferred to and utilized by police agencies across the country for
domestic activities.”77 What makes this phenomenon especially notable—and, by extension,
objectionable—is that this practice of mass surveillance by government- and state-funded
agencies is very much at odds with the supposed inalienable rights granted to American citizens.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution asserts “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” This right has been eroded over time courtesy of bureaucratic meddling and department
overreaches, many of which have been implemented—rather deceptively—in the purported
interest of “public safety.”
i.i pleading the fourth
The beginning of the undermining of the Fourth Amendment can be traced back to the
occupation of the postbellum American South, when Congress passed the Reconstruction Act of
1867, which “divided the former Confederate states into military districts and placed them under
the control of the U.S. Army, various commanders, and the U.S. attorney general. The military
was used as the primary source of civil law enforcement.”78 This occupation was viewed by
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many residents of the American south as a violation of the Fourth Amendment 79, and, after
tensions had come to a boil over widespread allegations of an unfair election, legislators
implemented the Posse Comitatus Act to attempt to douse the flames of resentment that were
being stoked within the occupied South, which “prohibited use of the army as a posse comitatus
(force of the people) except in cases where it was specifically allowed by the U.S. Constitution
or ordered by Congress” and made it illegal for the U.S. military to enforce civil laws as they
presently were in the Reconstruction-era South.80 It “sought explicitly to constrain the federal
government’s domestic use of its military power. Although the original law applied only to the
army, it was later amended to include the air force, the navy, and the marine corps. The National
Guard and the Coast Guard are exempt from the act so long as they remain under state
government control.”81 This was intended as a safeguard against the possibility of the federal
government overstepping its bounds and exerting control over the states without consequence.
As the occupation of the American South set a dangerous precedent for the federal government
to be able to occupy other states with no external checks needed, the Posse Comitatus Act put a
limit on the federal government’s ability to control and influence individual states. The initial
intent appears to have been to impose limits upon militarized or reactive regulatory bodies of the
state to keep them from exerting total control over the members of a smaller community, an
attempt to minimize the manifestation of the coercive or aggressive nature of these types of
regulatory bodies.
It would not take long for this provision intended to protect the Fourth Amendment right
of the average citizen to get in the way of the designs of the federal government. The Posse
79
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Comitatus Act was first suspended in WWI by “Secretary of War Newton D. Baker […] so the
military could be used to quell domestic disturbances while the National Guard was deployed
abroad. From 1917 to 1921, Baker's policy of ‘direct access’ allowed state and local agencies to
call on the military for assistance without the usual permissions.”82 Though at first glance, this
might appear to be a benefit to the less powerful state governments, it is preparing the grounds
for gross overreach in the future. It marks a return to the sharing of duty between a cohesive
reactive body, the United States military, and segmented domestic reactive bodies, the states’
National Guard. The next forays into undermining the Posse Comitatus Act occurred as part of
the aftermath of Wounded Knee in the U.S. v. McArthur (1975) case. This was concluded with
the ruling that “the armed forces had not violated the act because their presence had not
‘[s]ubjected citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory in nature, either presently or prospectively.’”83 Despite the appearance to some that
the U.S. military had violated the Act, the Supreme Court did not see it that way, creating a
loophole for occupation of state territory by federal military forces and military-police—police at
this time denoting local law enforcement—cooperation in the future. A year earlier, in U.S. v.
Walden (1974), there was an unsuccessful attempt to use federal military involvement that
violated the Act to dismiss charges brought against the defendant, but “courts ruled that a
violation of Posse Comitatus does not require evidentiary exclusion or the acquittal of a
defendant because the penalties for violating the act are plainly stated in the language of the
law.”84 By this point, cooperation between local, state, and federal reactive regulatory bodies had
been largely normalized and codified by these rulings by the Supreme Court, among other cases.
This erasure of the boundaries between these bodies would permit ease of sharing technologies, a
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consolidation of regulatory power, and an adaptation of their methods of dispensing discipline in
their respective functions.
This process has sped up dramatically over the past forty years, kicking off with
Reagan’s, Bush’s, and Clinton’s intensifications of Nixon’s War on Drugs. The Fourth
Amendment once protected against search and seizures by police without warrants and/or
probable cause as well, but the 1968 Supreme Court case Terry v. Ohio dismantled this
protection; “[k]nown as the stop-and frisk rule, the Terry decision stands for the proposition that,
so long as a police officer has 'reasonable articulable suspicion' that someone is engaged in
criminal activity and dangerous, it is constitutionally permissible to stop, question, and frisk him
or her—even in the absence of probable cause.”85 The wording of this decision is vague, which
makes it nigh impossible to determine whether an officer had ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’
at the time if asked to give an account of their reasoning in a courtroom. Since this ruling, “it is
no longer necessary for the police to have any reason to believe that people are engaged in
criminal activity or actually dangerous to stop and search them. As long as you give ‘consent,’
the police can stop, interrogate, and search you for any reason or no reason at all.”86 What counts
as consent is rather misleading, or at least, has become such after the resolution of a later
Supreme Court case: Florida v. Bostick. The Court ruled the search of the bus Bostick was
driving to be consensual, declaring that “Bostick's encounter with the police was purely
voluntary, and therefore he was not ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Even
if Bostick did not feel free to leave when confronted by police at the back of the bus, the proper
question, according to the Court, was whether ‘a reasonable person’ in Bostick's shoes would
have felt free to terminate the encounter. A reasonable person, the Court concluded, would have
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felt free to sit there and refuse to answer the police officer's questions, and would have felt free
to tell the officer ‘No, you can't search my bag.’”87 This is a peculiar decision, especially when
one considers that “a number of lower courts had found absurd the notion that ‘reasonable
people’ would feel empowered to refuse to answer questions when confronted by the police.”88
Considering the common consensus amongst average Americans that police are to be respected
and feared, and that they are to be complied with under any circumstance, and also the
militaristic and reactive nature of American policing, this verdict seems somewhat absurd,
especially coming from a branch of government that is supposed to function as an apolitical and
impartial supervisory body. Indeed, “the overwhelming majority of people who are confronted
by police and asked questions respond, and when asked to be searched, they comply. This is the
case even among those, like Bostick, who have every reason to resist these tactics because they
actually have something to hide. This is no secret to the Supreme Court. The Court long ago
acknowledged that effective use of consent searches by the police depends on the ignorance (and
powerlessness) of those who are targeted.”89
There is something to be said for the trend made visible here, that of cases against
members of a minority being decided in ways that “justify” violations of constitutional rights. A
population as diverse and striated as America’s hosts subnetworks of relationships of power
between cultural, ethnic, and social groups, and these can be pitted against one another either
organically or through subtle manipulation by other apparatuses of power to secure more power
for themselves. Through influencing these micro-relations of power, a larger power structure
may be able to produce a certain kind of institution-specific knowledge to make their agendas
more palatable, or to placate other groups for being especially aggressive in their disciplining of
87
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a specific subgroup. However, though this phenomenon is incredibly important, and certainly
provides insights into one tactic through which branches or apparatuses of government may
secure further control of the population at large, it is too complex an issue and too far removed
from the scope of Foucault’s works to be done justice here.
i.ii uninformed consent: “mission creep” and other power-grabbing tactics
Thus far, the police have only been acting as an apparatus of power and security could be
expected to act. It has a vested interest in continuing to expand the scope of its activities and
awareness of those upon whom it may act; this has been the direction in which policing seems to
have been headed since the relegation of its positive duties to other institutions. Surveillance is
just one tool it can use, admittedly a very important one, to expand its ‘sphere’ of influence.
When asked about the use and efficacy of surveillance to glean information about relationships
between groups and individuals, Foucault makes a poignant observation:
[W]hat I find most striking about these new technologies of power introduced since the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is their concrete and precise character, their grasp of
a multiple and differentiated reality. […] [A] form of power comes into being that begins
to exercise itself through social production and social service. It becomes a matter of
obtaining productive service from individuals in their concrete lives. And, in
consequence, a real and effective ‘incorporation’ of power was necessary, in the sense
that power had to be able to gain access to the bodies of individuals, to their acts,
attitudes, and modes of everyday behavior.90
This relatively “new” technology of surveillance was far from an accidental or
serendipitous consequence of police. For police to effectively regulate both physical and digital
interactions, trade, and crime, to continue to exert power over the average citizen of a state, it has
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to seize whatever means it can to perpetuate its own influence. To effectively “work within
reality,” as previously mentioned, surveillance techniques are a key component of reactive
regulatory forces’ ability to identify and prevent or respond to what the law (or officers or forces
themselves) deem criminal activity. They need whatever technological or fiscal advantages they
can accrue over the communities they oversee in order to maintain their level of power and
control. The police rely just as much on their perception and reputation in the public eye and the
lenience of other government agencies to hold onto the advantages and privileges they seek for
themselves, however.
There are specific tactics that either the police or the federal government can employ to
aid in the promulgation of this self-regulatory apparatus of state security. One of the ways that a
government agency can expand its budget is through “mission creep,” which occurs when an
agency “[expands] the scale and scope of their activities” with the intent “to signal to other parts
of government and to the public that the agency is engaged in the provision of crucial services.
Functionaries then use this expansion to justify requests for additional funding and employees.”91
They are also incentivized to exhaust the financial resources allocated to them as, by doing so, “a
bureau signals specifically that it needs additional resources in future periods to accomplish its
increasing portfolio of ‘crucial’ activities.” 92 Sometimes, it happens to work out that allowing
“mission creep” to blur the division between two of these agencies is to the advantage of both,
and this is the case for the police and the military, as both “are organized as bureaucracies and
have an inherent tendency to push to expand the range of their activities. Both look to increase
steadily their spending on new and existing activities […]. The military, looking to extend its
powers, expand its budget, and increase its personnel, has an incentive to expand into and exert
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influence over domestic police activities. […] The result of this process is a blurring of the
police/military distinction and the erosion of constraints on domestic police activities.”93 It is
noteworthy that these apparatuses of power are both security forces, and that both are reactive
regulatory bodies. This not only makes the sharing of their functions easier, but is also a way
through which they can consolidate and strengthen the disciplinary tactics they employ in
overseeing and controlling foreign or domestic activities.
There is the matter of public opinion to consider when an agency plans on expanding the
breadth of its dealings. In order to keep “mission creep” from becoming alarming to certain
observant members of society, some tact and subtlety is needed. This has led to the practice of
never letting a crisis go to waste, and, in fact, even to the creation and perpetuation of crises that
did not exist in the public’s mind previously; “crises, whether they are actual or merely perceived
(for example, the threat of drug gangs, terrorism, nuclear war, and so forth), provide an
opportunity for government to increase in size and scope. During times of crisis, the public cries
out for government to ‘do something.’ As indicated by the political economy of bureaucracy and
special interest, these groups take advantage of the crisis-spawned openings to expand their
operations. […] Once the crisis has ended, the government reduces its activities, but does not
return to its precrisis dimensions because some new programs, agency expansions, and spending
increases persist.”94 Foucault noted that apparatuses of power very often produce knowledge that
has the consequence of supporting their current causes or plans, and the police are no exception
to this. Police produce knowledge about people, and, to refer to a previously cited observation of
Foucault’s, about “everything that happens” in the public sphere (and sometimes even in private
ones). This refers not only to the convictions for which police forces are responsible, but arrest
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records, dispatch records, crime events, and sets of statistics based on the contents of these and
other police databases. This knowledge, then, has the tendency to perpetuate or justify the
expansion of police activity and control, particularly when removed from subjective context, as
is the case with the quoting and utilization of “crime statistics.”
Exemplifying the surprising effectiveness of this approach are both the “war on drugs”
and the “war on terror.” They enable this kind of bureaucratic behavior in two major ways:
because they are wars that take place both at home and abroad, it allows the use of military
forces on American soil to be justifiable, and there is no explicit, static end goal to be achieved
by these wars—they may be waged in perpetuity, with ample explanation and excuses for their
continuation—, “[t]herefore, the crises and the associated expansion in government will continue
into the foreseeable future, resulting in an ongoing 'ratcheting up' of government spending and
power.”95 Through cunning and sophistic misdirection, the government is able to effectively use
the fears of the governed—some of which are government-inflicted—to bolster their pet projects
in “response”. The complicity of the media in no small part contributes to the efficacy of this
approach, though a closer discussion of that relationship is best saved for later.
The War on Drugs was a very convenient way to pump funding into various police and
military ventures. The United States government took advantage of this crisis to increase “FBI
antidrug funding […] from $8 million to $95 million [over the course of four years, 1980-1984].
Department of Defense antidrug allocations increased from $33 million in 1981 to $1,042
million in 1991. During that same period, DEA antidrug spending grew from $86 to $1,026
million, and FBI antidrug allocations grew from $38 to $181 million. By contrast, funding for
agencies responsible for drug treatment, prevention, and education was dramatically reduced.
The budget of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, for example, was reduced from $274
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million to $57 million from 1981 to 1984, and antidrug funds allocated to the Department of
Education were cut from $14 million to $3 million.”96 Some of the funds set aside for use in the
waging of this imprecisely-defined perpetual “war” were not even explicitly designated for any
set function, and were used to wave away what would otherwise seem to be fascistic
decisions—“[i]n September 1986, with the media frenzy at full throttle, the House passed
legislation that allocated $2 billion to the antidrug crusade, required the participation of the
military in narcotics control efforts, allowed the death penalty for some drug-related crimes, and
authorized the admission of some illegally obtained evidence in drug trials.”97
It also, more or less, gave police carte blanche to act as they see fit, provided it was in the
purported interest of seizing drugs and putting away those involved with them. In The New Jim
Crow, Michelle Alexander notes that “[t]he absence of significant constraints on the exercise of
police discretion is a key feature of the drug war’s design. It has made the roundup of millions of
Americans for nonviolent drug offenses relatively easy.”98 She argues that the federal
government has been very lenient with law enforcement and almost eager to give it more and
more impunity in its dealings with U.S. citizens, and there has been an especially dramatic shift
of power from the people to the state within the last forty years: “[p]olice searches of vehicles
are but one example [of police overreach]. Virtually all constitutionally protected civil liberties
have been undermined by the drug war. The Court has been busy in recent years approving
mandatory drug testing of employees and students, upholding random searches and sweeps of
public schools and students, permitting police to obtain search warrants based on an anonymous
informant’s tip, expanding the government's wiretapping authority, legitimating the use of paid,
unidentified informants by police and prosecutors, approving the use of helicopter surveillance
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of homes without a warrant, and allowing the forfeiture of cash, homes, and other property based
on unproven allegations of illegal drug activity.”99 For specific examples of this favor, refer to
the previously covered Supreme Court rulings on cases involving police overreach in relation to
civilians’ Fourth Amendment rights, and note how these landmark cases always favor the police
in their resolution.
The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon paved the way for the near-total evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections. It
took little more than a month for Congress to draft up the USA PATRIOT Act in response to the
attacks; this proposed piece of legislation “reduced restrictions on law enforcement personnel
and allowed them to gather more intelligence information on U.S. civilians. It also authorized
indefinite detentions and the search of private property without the owner's consent or
knowledge and expanded the ability of federal forces to search telephone, email, and financial
records without a court order.”100 It was sold to the public as necessary to catch and prevent
terrorist activities both foreign and domestic, never mind the fact that this piece of legislation
completely eviscerated the right to privacy of every law-abiding citizen in the process. The bill
was passed in the Senate with only one dissenting voice—Russ Feingold, a Democratic senator
from Wisconsin101—and signed into law by George W. Bush only three days later, on October 26,
2001102. This was far from the only domain ceded to state and local law enforcement; “mission
creep” was enabled and even encouraged between police and the FBI as they “began to expand
its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) for the purpose of sharing intelligence, training, and
other knowledge across agencies. Coordinated through the FBI, information flows freely
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between federal, state, and local agencies connected through the JTTFs. The original JTTF was
based in New York City, but over time more than 100 such task forces expanded across the
country. […] 71 forces were added after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.”103
i.iii police privilege and its consequences
Despite the significant developments and advances made in surveillance technology,
police surveillance itself remains an inefficient and even dubious technique. Police end up
harassing a lot of innocent people before they find someone who is guilty of committing a
crime—though it also happens that they sometimes tire of waiting for a perpetrator and may
plant evidence on an innocent individual, possibly to keep up arrest rates or to bolster whatever
statistics they need to generate to continue to receive the same level of funding. The innocents
who have been made to fear for their lives and had their property torn through have next to no
legal recourse, unless their situation is extreme104. Alexander remarks that “[t]he inevitable result
is that the people who wind up in front of a judge are usually guilty of some crime. The parade of
guilty people through America's courtrooms gives the false impression to the public—as well as
to judges—that when the police have a ‘hunch,’ it makes sense to let them act on it.”105 If that
alone were not enough to call the ethicality—and efficacy—of these methods of interrogation
and surveillance into question, consider that there is no “special police training” that helps the
police find drug traffickers. Consider the purpose of “[the DEA-funded Operation Pipeline],
administered by over three hundred state and local law enforcement agencies, [which] trains state
and local law enforcement officers to use pretextual traffic stops and consent searches on a large
scale for drug interdiction. Officers learn, among other things, how to use a minor traffic
violation as a pretext to stop someone, how to lengthen a routine traffic stop and leverage it into
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a search for drugs, how to obtain consent from a reluctant motorist, and how to use drug sniffing
dogs to obtain probable cause.”106 The idea here is clearly not to protect society against
“dangerous” people, but a highly inefficient attempt to regulate attitudes and exert their influence
further over the social and economic sphere of relationships between Americans. Highlighting
the inefficiency of this method even further, “[t]he ‘drug-courier profiles’ utilized by the DEA
and other law enforcement agencies for drug sweeps on highways, as well as in airports and train
stations, are notoriously unreliable. […] Even striving to obey the law fits the profile!”107 The
justifications for this mass surveillance are undermined by the reality of the poor track record of
these programs to catch actual criminals—and for how much hassle and grief they can cause for
innocent civilians, particularly those belonging to marginalized communities.
The idealistic vision for this discipline was that it “must be equal for all, important as it is
for the good of the state as for all who live well and honestly within it.”108 Those living in reality
are well aware that this has never been and, in spite of even the best-intentioned society’s efforts,
never will be the case. Part of the problem with this dangerously optimistic outlook is made
evident in the very structure of the current system of policing—that is, the fact that it is a
bureaucratic institution. Such institutions are dependent on continual growth and reinforcing
their authority relative to the other arms of government, and thus are constantly locked in power
struggles with these other branches—as well as occasionally with the populace itself, though this
is a rarer occurrence. From a Foucauldian perspective, because the original conceptualization of
American government provided its citizens with so many freedoms, this continual process of the
police amassing more power can be made a tolerable—even necessary—concession in the eyes
of the general public. Of particular use in this effort is the “knowledge”—that is, the crime
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statistics, arrest records, and individual profiles—that the police generate, as it can be used to
justify their continued expansion into other fields and their increased access to and possession of
military-grade equipment.
Indeed, there has been quite an uptick not only in police force funding but also in the
quality and quantity of specialized equipment allotted to them. The United States has been
subject to indirect militarization of their “peacekeeping” forces, which “occurs when domestic
police forces acquire military characteristics over time. Instead of performing their standard
function of enforcing laws to protect property, police begin proactively to seek criminals and to
use military strategy, weaponry, and tactics (for example, no-knock raids, counterterrorism
operations, and so forth).”109 There are many concrete indicators of this militarization:
Domestic law enforcement has taken on the characteristics of the armed forces by
engaging in military-style training, acquiring military weapons, and utilizing military
tactics in everyday operations. To illustrate this militarization, consider the number of
state and local law enforcement agencies that have acquired and maintained police
paramilitary units (PPUs) or special weapons and tactics (SWAT) units. In 1982, 59
percent of police departments employed a PPU. By 1990, 78 percent of departments had
a PPU, and by 1995, the portion had grown to 89 percent (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, 6).
Police departments of all sizes around the country have obtained and maintained
hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of military equipment, ranging from M-16 assault
rifles, riot gear, and body armor to tanks, grenade launchers, and armored vehicles.
Further, the use of wire tapping, the examination of financial and other personal records
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without judicial clearance, and other violations of personal liberties that were once
unimaginable are no longer uncommon practices among domestic police.110
These new and often expensive privileges enable the police to expand the scope of and to
hone their methods of disciplining the public, though one would not be remiss to question why
such overpowered equipment is being given to them with the permission to use it more or less as
they see fit, and not solely to be used in the service of a specific function or cause. This is easily
answered by considering to whom it is the police are beholden; at least in the present day, they
can only be held accountable by the courts, and the only bodies that can influence or direct their
funding other than the departments themselves are federal and state government agencies.
Though the police command some power, they are, in turns, held in check by or supported by
their relations of power with other institutions and agencies. To better understand how these
relationships influence the duties and privileges of police forces, as well as their public
reputation and even the facilitation of the bending of law in their favor, one must divide this
issue into specific organizational reciprocities and consider their exchange of favors in the proper
context.
ii. Bureaucratic and Institutional Reciprocity
The Reagan administration financially incentivized police to engage in the drug war by
giving “state and local law enforcement agencies […] the authority to keep, for their own use,
the vast majority of cash and assets they seized when waging the drug war.”111 So long as the
drug war continued to be waged, police forces would be allowed to benefit from a new and
unethical source of revenue. They could “[increase] the size of their budgets, quite substantially,
simply by taking the cash, cars, and homes of people suspected of drug use or sales. At the time
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the new rules were adopted, the law governing civil forfeiture was so heavily weighted in favor
of the government that fully 80 percent of forfeitures went uncontested. Property or cash could
be seized based on mere suspicion of illegal drug activity, and the seizure could occur without
notice or hearing upon an ex parte showing of mere probable cause to believe that the property
had somehow been ‘involved’ in a crime.” 112 In this dubious practice of asset forfeiture, police
have been given so much leniency in this regard they sometimes forego all legal pretense. The
bar for proving an item’s involvement in a crime is incredibly low, to the point where it hardly
matters if its owner is indisputably innocent of any wrongdoing—“[p]rior to the Reform Act, the
Supreme Court had ruled that the guilt or innocence of the property's owner was irrelevant to the
property's guilt—a ruling based on the archaic legal fiction that a piece of property could be
‘guilty’ of a crime. […] [T]he government's burden of proof is so low—the government need
only establish by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ that the property was involved in the
commission of a drug crime.”113 Despite the Reform Act’s attempt to prevent unconstitutional
seizures of private property, its wording makes it a relatively toothless piece of legislation. This
has been a very profitable side-venture for police, as, “according to a report commissioned by the
Department of Justice, between 1998 and 1992 alone, Byrne-funded task forces seized over $1
billion in assets. Remarkably, this figure does not include drug task forces funded by the DEA or
other federal agencies.”114
Even without considering the mutual “mission creep” between state and local law
enforcement and the U.S. military, there are many mutually beneficial relationships the police
have with other private and bureaucratic institutions that have influenced our laws and social
norms. One of the most insidious relationships is between law enforcement and prison-guard
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unions and private prisons. Both the police and prison-guard unions have a common interest in
perpetuating the drug war to keep up their increased funding, as, “[o]ne program, Community
Oriented Policing Services, allocated more than $10 billion to more than 12,000 agencies in less
than a decade (Eisler and Johnson 2005). The availability of these funds and the lure of further
windfall profits prompted these groups to push for expanded drug laws and additional
drug-interdiction activities. A relaxation of drug laws would mean smaller budgets for police and
prison-guard unions.”115 The interest of private prisons in the continuation of the War on Drugs is
more widely understood—“[i]ncome for these firms depends directly on the number of
incarcerated individuals. The increased penalties for drug crimes advocated by police unions
have made private prisons a particularly lucrative business.”116 Many other industries in the
private sector exert their influence over our legislation through lobbyist payouts, one of these
being “[t]he drone lobby[, which] includes the manufacturers of drones as well as those who
provide support services—training, maintenance, and consulting services—for the aircraft. […]
[T]he Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International more than doubled its lobbying
budget in 2011 in support of House Resolution 658,” or the “Federal Aviation Administration Air
Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act,” which “authorizes domestic use of
aerial spy drones by the U.S. government.”117 This legislation was adopted in 2012.118
ii.i complicity of the media: state propaganda
When discussing the theory of policing proposed during the Enlightenment, Foucault
emphasizes “[p]olice is not justice. Whether written by those who support and justify the need
for a police, or by jurists or parliamentarians who display a certain mistrust of police, all the texts
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agree on this: police is seen as not being justice. Of course, like justice it derives from royal
power, but it remains clearly separated from justice.”119 That view has been buried over time,
both in the United States court system and in the public’s perception.
From whence did all this public support for these initiatives and restrictions of individual
freedoms originate?120 The government poured significant sums of money into community
outreach programs such as DARE to promote a positive image of their “War on Drugs,” and it
paid off: “in 1989, 70 percent [of polled Americans] favored using military assistance
(equipment and supplies) abroad to fight drug trafficking, and 69 percent favored using military
advisors to support foreign troops in their efforts to combat drugs.”121 In the case of the terrorist
attacks on 9/11, very little positive spin was needed to make the government’s response
palatable, as, unlike the “War on Drugs”, the “War on Terror” had a very definite—and for many,
traumatic—beginning. The September 11 attacks presented the government with a golden
opportunity for overreach, as the climate of fear and insecurity amongst the public inclined them
to take a more positive view of government surveillance and militarization of domestic law
enforcement: at this time, “63 percent of Americans thought it would be necessary for the
average person to give up some civil liberties to curb terrorism” and “86 percent of Americans
approved of the use of facial-recognition software by authorities at public events. In addition, 63
percent favored extending the use of cameras and other surveillance technologies, and 54 percent
approved of increased monitoring of private cell phones, emails, and Internet usage.”122 Hall and
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Coyne further note the shift in Americans’ attitudes, particularly highlighting an increase of their
trust in the United States government:
On September 7, 2001, a Gallup poll had found that only 14 percent of Americans trusted
the government a ‘great deal’ with regard to its ability to handle foreign problems, and
only 6 percent trusted the government's capabilities in regard to handling domestic
troubles. By October 2001, however, 36 percent of Americans reported a ‘great deal’ of
trust in the government on foreign issues, and 24 percent 'highly trusted' the government
on domestic issues. A total of 83 percent felt a ‘great deal’ or ‘fair amount’ of trust on
foreign issues. Finally, 77 percent expressed confidence in the government's ability to
handle domestic concerns.123
There are also many cases where the media has been more complicit than airing
government-funded advertising or making clever use of tragedies to conveniently back up a
desired government program or flattering narrative. Sometimes, as was the case in the “Jaubert
Affair,” the press chooses to take law enforcement at their word on specific cases against
individuals and report on their account as if it was indisputable fact to sway the “court of public
opinion”. This incident involved French journalist Alain Jaubert, following his request to some
police officers to accompany an injured member of the Antillaise (revolutionary movement?) to
the hospital, on account of his occupation. Though they were five minutes from a hospital, it
took thirty minutes for the police to take the injured revolutionary to it, and fifty-five minutes
later, Jaubert re-emerges, bloodied and in destroyed clothing. He is accused the following
evening of assaulting the agents and trying to escape from the moving van, and was placed under
arrest for rebellion, assault and contempt of law enforcement officers. This information did not
add up to many journalists and activists, and Foucault, among others, rallied in defense of
123
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Jaubert.124 Foucault accuses the press of this behavior and admonishes them for running
conflicting narratives, some of which depart partially or completely from the facts of the
incident.125 In a case involving the fate of an activist journalist, Foucault decries bad journalism,
remarking that “[t]he Jaubert case is certainly a roughed-up sort, but it [demonstrates] an
unhealthy, dangerous relationship between the police and the press, too: a relationship made
from lies, pressure, insinuations and maneuvers. The relationship between the police and the law
is dangerous as well: interdependence, various reciprocities, a game of referrals and sleuths.
Finally, there is the unhealthy and dangerous relationship between the judicial apparatus and the
police: intimidation, pressure, fear.”126
ii.ii complicity of the courts
The judiciary system has played no small part in enabling the militarization of police and
incentivizing their miscarriages of duty as well. Regarding this particular societal issue, Foucault
warns that, “[f]or a justice system to be unjust, it doesn’t need to convict the wrong individual; it
only needs to judge in the wrong way.”127 Serving as evidence of such occurrences are the
previously cited Supreme Court rulings that favored protecting the actions of police over the
security and rights of the “rabble,” where blatantly unconstitutional decisions were made to
bolster the authority of law enforcement. Oftentimes courts play as accomplices to officers who
use excessive force in apprehending suspects, in addition to protecting those who overstep the
law in regard to search and seizure or in “obtaining consent” from a suspect. There has also been
a trend in many recent trials involving excessive force in apprehending suspects where the law
enforcement official(s) in question are either completely exonerated based on tenuous defenses
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(reasonable suspicion, for one), specially selected or “fragmented” bodycam footage (see the
Rodney King case’s proceedings and decision128), or any number of other convenient excuses.
Though some judges—mostly local and even some state—have fought admirably to protect the
rights of individuals, many of those belonging to federal courts and the Supreme Court have
shown a willingness to bend or ignore rulings that they or their predecessors had established
previously, all in the name of “public safety.”
On the subject of complicit judges, Foucault’s involvement in the aforementioned
“Jaubert Affair” extends beyond his critique of the story’s handling by the media—he also
expressed disagreement with the way the court intended to handle the case. His distrust led him
to go so far as to declare a counter-inquest to the official investigation, to ensure the police will
be held accountable by someone for their misuse of power. He bases this demand for the creation
of a counter-investigation force and justifies his complaints about the handling of the Jaubert
incident on a violation of Article 15 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), insisting that
“[s]ociety has the right to hold all public administrators accountable.”129 Foucault emphasizes
that the commission he helped to organize and served as a part of is not trying to do the justice
system's job for them, or attempting to co-opt their function; rather, they aim to take stock of the
dangers the system poses to the people, and to speak out about it and provide methods of defense
against its abuses.130 His desire to be a part of this effort is amplified by what he discovers when
questioning witnesses about the Jaubert case—mainly, that many of them expressed fear of the
police, and wished to remain anonymous in their testimony that contradicted the police’s
narrative.131 He warns that, “[w]hen people are afraid of their police, when one no longer dares to
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seek recourse in one’s judiciary system because one knows it is too dependent on the police,
when at last the press and public opinion, one’s last appeal, are at risk of being poisoned,
maneuvered by the police, then the situation is grim”.132 In fact, Foucault’s concern turns out to
have been warranted, as he notes that, by the time he and his allies on this commission found
enough witnesses to establish the exact timeline of the incident, from the beginning to the end of
Jaubert’s run-in with the police, within two days, Jaubert was convicted of his alleged crimes by
a judge, based on no evidence other than that given by the police, whom the court had to pay for
their testimony.133 This was an intentional move; Foucault explains that, “[b]y charging Jaubert
with assault and contempt of law enforcement, the examining magistrate covered up the extreme
violence of the police. We can no longer hope that, in these same hands, such examinations will
be carried out correctly.”134
The fault seldom falls solely upon judges when a case is poorly handled, however.
Foucault wrote about a court verdict he vehemently disagreed with that involved the execution of
a man, Ranucci, after he was convicted of the murder of a little girl on dubious grounds—it was
still unclear whether he had committed the crime.135 Foucault explains the elements of the crime
that do not match up with the reality of Ranucci’s situation; though there were some unusual and
suspicious things noted about his appearance when he was apprehended, his car and he himself
were not recognized by any eyewitnesses to the crime. However, all it takes is “[e]leven hours of
interrogation, and he confesses. He confesses again twice in the following moments.”136 Not only
were the facts of the case not adding up, “certain details of the confession were not correct; and
that on many, seemingly false points, Ranucci had told the truth.”137 Instead of this exonerating
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Ranucci, the facts of the case shifted to fit his confession.138 Foucault refuses to hold solely the
police accountable for this outcome, as, “if the justice system, from top to bottom, were not such
a consumer of confessions, the police would be less apt to produce them, and by every means.”139
He asks of the process: “you wonder what went wrong with that machine that should have halted
at every moment, or, rather, what kept it going: the bias of the police, a judge's hostility, the
sensationalism of the press? Yes, those things were a factor, but at bottom, and holding it all ‘on
track,’ there was something simple and monstrous—laziness. The laziness of the investigators,
the judges, the lawyers, of the whole legal apparatus. A justice system is ludicrous when it is so
indolent that it doesn’t manage to deliver a verdict. But one that deals out a death sentence with
an almost sleepy gesture…”140 The public does not escape his criticism in this process, as their
disposition toward the accused can, in fact, have some influence over the verdict of a case, and
many make up their minds about the accused based on the crime and the person’s background
before a proper trial even begins.141
These apparatuses of power have become abusive in their ministrations to society, both at
the individual level and at large. They continue to spread their influence, covertly or overtly, into
new domains, and serve to reinforce the authority of other institutions that might otherwise see
them as rivals for government funding. As Foucault gravely notes in his call to action in «
L’article 15 », “[the Jaubert] case is far from isolated. Incidents of this kind have multiplied for
months: all give evidence of a system where magistrates and police give each other a hand. This
system is a threat to all of us, and we must defend ourselves relentlessly against it.”142 Though it
is not the primary or even major focus of any of his body of works, Foucault’s understanding of
138
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society, power relations, and the aims of the state can provide us with the knowledge and
framework for doing just that.
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IV. The (F)utility of Reform
It is perfectly reasonable to wonder, after beginning to learn the extent and pervasiveness
of police overreach, its authoritarian character, and the complicity of many other government and
private institutions, what, if anything, one is able to do about it. After all, on the individual level,
there really is not much that can effectively be done—change must be brought about through
collective action, but this has its risks; one might merely be aiding one oppressive regime in
overthrowing another or replacing one abusive institution with a superficially different copy. It is
difficult to be able to tell whether a large social movement will bring about the changes one
wants to see in an institution or in the state itself, or even if it will result in its own purported
aims. With the track record many revolutions have, exchanging one despot or malignant
institution for another, it is understandable that an individual may feel cynical and wary of any
attempts to shift the status quo, no matter their concerns about its trajectory or how unpleasant
they may find it.
As tenuous as one’s position is in regard to effecting positive social changes and
redirecting power, Foucault does not believe that one should not try to change one’s situation
when one sees it as intolerable. In Useless to Revolt?, Foucault addresses the titular query with a
warning not to take every ‘revolutionary’ or reformer at their word, but also urges us not to write
off the possibility of achieving positive changes in society entirely:
No one has the right to say, ‘Revolt for me; the final liberation of all men depends on it.’
But I am not in agreement with anyone who would say, ‘it is useless for you to revolt; it
is always going to be the same thing.’ One does not dictate to those who risk their lives
facing a power. […] A convict risks his life to protest unjust punishments; a madman can
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no longer bear being confined and humiliated; a people refuses the regime that oppresses
it. That doesn’t make the first innocent, doesn’t cure the second, and doesn’t ensure for
the third the tomorrow it is promised. […] All the disenchantments of history won’t alter
the fact of the matter: it is because there are such voices that the time of human beings
does not have the form of evolution but that of ‘history,’ precisely.143
One cannot do away with power; it can only change hands and methods of control. This
is also not necessarily a worrying thing—power, when used to the benefit of more than just the
state, when it prioritizes citizen happiness and freedoms while giving some concern for safety,
does not have to be unbearably oppressive. Those who claim that there is a movement in
American society to “abolish” policing pretend that these groups wish to replace it with nothing,
when that is far from true; one only has to ask a member of these activist groups to learn that
they are actually reformers, advocating for a different allocation and distribution of power than
that which currently exists. It is ludicrous to think one could abolish this apparatus of power, but
significantly less so to consider the ways in which it might be changed to serve its role less
invasively or brutally. Foucault suggests that this is something to keep in mind, that “the power
that one man exerts over another is always perilous. I am not saying that power, by nature, is
evil; I am saying that power, with its mechanisms, is infinite (which does not mean that it is
omnipotent […]). The rules that exist to limit it can never be stringent enough; the universal
principles for dispossessing it of all the occasions it seizes are never sufficiently rigorous.
Against power one must always set inviolable laws and unrestricted rights.”144
As our rights are continuing to be infringed upon, inaction is no longer a viable position
to any self-respecting person aware of this trend, save for those who are uncertain of how they
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can combat this. Though there is risk inherent in taking a stand against any apparatus of power,
even if that opposition is nonviolent, rational, and social opinion favors it, there are some
methods more effective and less likely to end in tragedy than defying significant apparatuses of
power head-on. Foucault also encourages those who wish to bring about meaningful change to
think beyond the state:
To pose the problem in terms of the state means to continue posing it in terms of
sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say, in terms of law. […] I don't want to say that the
state isn't important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis
that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state—in two
senses. First of all, because the state, for all the omnipotence of apparatuses, is far from
being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations; and, further, because the
state can only operate on the basis of other, already-existing power relations. The state is
superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body,
sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth. True, these networks
stand in a conditioning-conditioned relationship to a kind of ‘metapower’ structured
essentially around a certain number of great prohibition functions; but this metapower
with its prohibitions can only take hold and secure its footing where it is rooted in a
whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations that us supply the necessary basis
for the great negative forms of power.145
Whether one is aware of it or not, the state is dependent not only on its apparatuses of
power, external and internal, but also on social and economic relationships within the governed
body, between groups and individuals. Thus, it can be affected by changes in these relationships
of power—communities, when organized and relatively uniform in intent, can have more of an
145

Foucault, “Truth and Power” in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984: Power, 122-123.

Arterberry 58

impact than people tend to realize. Community organizing is an effective way to shift the power
dynamic between the governed and the state, albeit on a “micro”-level. Furthermore, working
towards change does not have to be done overtly; “there are many different kinds of revolution,
roughly speaking, as many kinds as there are possible subversive recodifications of power
relations.”146 The most effective methods of achieving desired social change or shifts in relations
of power are often indirect and subtle. It is perfectly acceptable, commendable, even, to decide to
try and tackle the issues one wishes to resolve from the inside of an apparatus of the state or the
community one deems to be malfunctioning or using its power harmfully.
Making the decision to move from bystander to player in the struggle for societal control
can be daunting—until one realizes that, willingly or not, they have always been a part of the
game. What is different now is that one is taking an active role; one is declaring: “I can no longer
remain impartial in this struggle, I refuse to delude myself into thinking the privation of others’
rights is neither my concern nor will affect me.” Though successful revolution or social change
rarely occurs from sudden upheaval, it is far from impossible that one should succeed in enacting
some level of reform in one’s state or an apparatus of state power if they are reserved and
deliberate in their strategy, especially if they are able to connect and collaborate with others to
reinforce common goals. Foucault’s exposure of the mystified inner workings of relations of
power and the subjectivity of truth serves as a basis for further specified inquiries into the nature
of other apparatuses of power—as, indeed, it served for this overview of the influence and
privileges of the United States’ police—, but also can point motivated community advocates and
activists toward productive modes of rebellion. The nature of power and how it is expressed is
incapable of truly changing, but the intended effects, as well as checks and balances
implemented by opposing apparatuses of power can, and in many cases, should.
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